Criminal RICO Claims in Central District Court of CA
November 6, 2012 § Leave a comment
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL, FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT; THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI; THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA; THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE GEORGE H. KING; THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ANDRÉ BIROTTE, JR.; AND TO ALL PARTIES THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
A. Motion for Decisions Without Further Delay
1. Plaintiff, Erin K. Baldwin (“Plaintiff”) appears to present this Motion for Decision Without Further Delay to Chief Judge George H. King (“Judge King”) pursuant to Local Rule 83-9.
2. Local Rule 83-9 states the procedure to obtain a ruling from the Chief Judge of the District on a motion pending before this Court longer than four (4) months.
3. An important ruling in Plaintiff’s §1983 case has been pending for ten (10) months thereby evoking Local Rule 83-9.
4. The pending motion is Plaintiff’s December 6, 2011 Amended Request for Leave to Amend Section 1983 Complaint, et al. (“Request for Leave”).
5. The requirement for a joint statement of counsel under Local Rule 83-9 is not applicable because Plaintiff’s motion was unopposed.
6. A motion before the “assigned judicial officer,” is also not applicable because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s case does not have an “assigned judicial officer.”
7. On or about January 17, 2012, former-Chief Judge Audrey B. Collins (“Judge Collins”) ordered an administrative reassignment of Plaintiff’s case to District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee (“Judge Gee”). 
B. Violations of Federal Law Voids Reassignment and Orders
8. Judge Collins’ action violates 28 U.S.C. §137 that prohibits a Chief Judge from reassigning a case after recusal in a manner not approved by that District’s General Orders.
9. The relevant Central District General Order is 08-05 that mandates random reassignment of cases after recusal.
10. As such, Judge Collins’ reassignment of Plaintiff’s case to Judge Gee violates both General Order 08-05 and Title 28 U.S.C. §137.
11. Judge Collins’ violations of federal law in the unlawful reassignment of Plaintiff’s case to Judge Gee voids the reassignment and subsequent orders of Judge Gee.
12. For the past nine (9) months Judge Gee has knowingly and maliciously acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction to irreconcilably compromise Plaintiff’s case.
13. The unlawful reassignment is further evidenced by Judge Gee’s failure to serve to parties her Initial Standing Order that states, inter alia:
“This case has been assigned to the calendar of Judge Dolly M. Gee. Both the Court and counsel bear responsibility for the progress of this litigation in federal court. To ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of this case, as called for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, all parties or their counsel are ordered to become familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of the Central District of California, and this Court’s standing orders.”
14. The unlawful reassignment is further evidenced by Judge Gee’s failure to assign a magistrate for discovery purposes, set a trial date, issue a 26(f) Scheduling Order, Case Management Order and Order Commencing Discovery.
15. Judge Collins’ violations of federal law and Judge Gee’s orders and actions in the clear absence of jurisdiction also voids any affect of Judge Gee’s orders and actions.
C. Violations of Federal Law Voids Orders Dismissing Appeals
16. The unlawful reassignment is further evidenced by Judge Gee’s orders prejudicing Plaintiff’s appeals pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”).
17. The day after the unlawful assignment (and without serving standard case-iniating orders), Judge Gee sought to adversely prejudice Plaintiff’s pending appeals.
18. First, Judge Gee’s orders, infra, violate the Ninth Circuit Divestiture Rule by ruling on matters properly removed from district court jurisdiction on appeal.
19. Second, Judge Gee’s January 18, 2012 order includes authorities that serve no purpose other than to prejudice Plaintiff’s appeal, all of which are flawed in fact and law:
“Although it is clear that the Ninth Circuit lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s appeal, see, e.g., Skoog v. County of Clackamas, (finding no appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal from denial of leave to file fourth amended complaint), and a district court need not refrain from deciding a matter on appeal where it is clear that appellate jurisdiction is lacking, see United States v. Hickey,  (“Filing an appeal from an unappealable decision does not divest the district court of jurisdiction,”  the Court declines to proceed in this instance. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amended request for leave to amend is hereby STAYED until the Ninth Circuit resolves her appeal.”
20. Plaintiff requested leave to file a third amended complaint and current Ninth Circuit appellate jurisdiction states: “It is well-established Ninth Circuit law that where the district court expressly denies leave to amend, the order is final and appealable.” 
21. On January 23, 2012 Judge Gee filed an order deeming Plaintiff’s appeals frivolous and made in bad faith affixing her personal signature. Shortly thereafter, this order was replaced by the same order bearing a name stamp in place of her personal signature.
22. On February 16, 2012, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction in direct opposition with its own longstanding precedent.
23. Judge Gee failed to rule on Plaintiff’s amended request for leave to amend that she had “stayed until the Ninth Circuit resolves her appeal.”
24. Instead, four months later on June 12, 2012, Judge Gee initiated a series of orders to avoid making the decision her January 18, 2012 order promised to make.
25. And four months after that, on October 16, 2012, the Ninth Circuit joined in on Judge Gee’s unfounded claim Plaintiff was appealing from unappealable orders and ordered her to show cause why she shouldn’t be sanctioned and subjected to a pre-filing order for same.
26. To date, the Ninth Circuit has only issued one Mandate in Plaintiff’s five appeals; the official court procedure for ending an appeal.
27. The Ninth Circuit Clerk states this is because Plaintiff’s four remaining appeals are pending decisions on her timely-filed Petitions for Rehearing.
28. If Plaintiff’s appeals are still open pending decisions, and Mandates have not issued ending the appeals … then how could Plaintiff’s appeals be dismissed … and how could Plaintiff be subject to sanctions and a pre-filing order for filing appeals from unappealable orders? Last, upon what authority does the Ninth Circuit issue a pre-filing order on behalf of a District Court?
29. Plaintiff also directs this Motion to Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski for a Decision Without Further Delay on Plaintiff’s pending Petitions for Rehearing and an order voiding the dismissal orders and the pending order to show cause.
D. Ninth Circuit Orders Prejudice Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court
30. On July 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the denial of her Petition for First Amendment Writ of Mandate.
31. To comply with Supreme Court Rule 13, Plaintiff filed multiple pleadings in the Ninth Circuit requesting final orders, all of which were ignored.
32. One of the questions presented to the Supreme Court supports Plaintiff’s arguments, supra:
“Whether the District Court acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction and abused its discretion by writing prejudicial post-appeal orders without jurisdiction to cast Petitioner in a false light, taint the record on appeal, and secure an advantage for the State Bar of California and other defendants named in her Section 1983 case.”
33. On September 24, 2012, Plaintiff’s petition was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court Justices in a formal conference.
34. On September 28, 2012, the Central District announced Judge Collins was vacating her position as Chief Judge two years early and without an explanation.
35. On October 1, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition without an opinion.
36. Plaintiff asserts the answer to her question presented, supra, is “yes.”
E. Motion for Federal Grand Jury Investigation
37. Plaintiff also appears to request commencement of a federal grand jury investigation regarding criminal counterparts to Plaintiff’s private action civil causes of action under the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Title 18 U.S.C. §1962.
38. Accordingly, Plaintiff directs this Motion to U.S. Attorney André Birotte, Jr. of the U.S. Attorney General’s Office of the Central District Court of California for response.
40. Plaintiff’s §1983 case has the elements of a civil RICO claim, to wit: The conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (i.e., multiple acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion) caused injury to Plaintiff’s personal property, intellectual property, and businesses. 
41. Plaintiff’s civil RICO claims also include pecuniary losses caused by law enforcement racketeering. In October 2009, Plaintiff was subjected to a State Bar-premeditated beating in custody by five male sheriffs resulting in injuries that limit her ability to work. These injuries were exacerbated by San Bernardino official attempts to conceal same. 
42. Also, the enterprise “conspired to violate §1962(c)” because evidence demonstrates knowledge and agreement to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or management of a RICO enterprise.” 
43. An individual enterprise member does not have to perform the predicate acts to be liable. 
44. “A corporation may engage in a RICO conspiracy with its own officers and representatives … Section 1962(d) applies to intracorporate, as well as intercorporate conspiracies.” 
45. Many members of the enterprise have demonstrated “a pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient continuity so as to pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” 
46. One of these members is UDR, Inc. whose first offense was on February 11, 2009 and its most recent, October 16, 2012.
47. The large volume of cases filed by UDR, Inc. against Plaintiff is directly proportionate to the volume of criminal acts UDR has committed and wants to conceal.
48. This is because UDR, Inc. “is not a legal entity,” and “cannot sue or be sued.”  As a real estate investment trust, it is “simply a collection of assets and liabilities,”  and “is not a ‘person’ but rather a fiduciary relationship with respect to property.” 
49. However, this hasn’t limited UDR litigation, the common objective of which is interference in Plaintiff’s protected property and business interests.
50. “Legal title to property owned by a trust is held by the trustee,”  and “as a general rule, the trustee is the real party in interest with standing to sue and defend on the trust’s behalf.” 
51. Therefore, even though Colorado-based UDR, Inc. did not perform the predicate acts, it is still liable, supra, as are all the enterprise members that performed the predicate acts on UDR, Inc.’s behalf.
52. These members include judges of the Orange County Superior Court, the Orange County Board of Supervisors, District Attorney, Public Defender, Sheriff’s Department as well as many federal court judicial officers and San Bernardino County officials. 
53. Plaintiff asserts protection and reporting credit under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act pursuant to the publicly-traded status of UDR, Inc. 54. Plaintiff asserts protection and reporting credit under the IRS Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 pursuant to the real estate investment trust status of UDR, Inc.
F. The RICO Common Purpose & Underlying Fraud
55. Enterprise members conspired to violate the RICO participation provision by agreeing to participate as an enterprise in ongoing civil and criminal actions against Plaintiff.
56. The RICO Common Purpose:
Enterprise members acted to prevent Plaintiff from advancing public awareness and support for unified petitions for redress on behalf of California consumers and tenants harmed by loan modification fraud and unlawful residential lease agreements.
57. The RICO Underlying Fraud:
Enterprise members acted to eliminate any competing influences addressing restitution to California consumers and tenants that could interfere in obtaining settlement agreements with banks California officials knew would not be used to make restitution to consumers and tenants.
58. Plaintiff’s asserted common purpose and underlying fraud, supra, is supported by California’s “Statement of Use” in each bank settlement agreement confirming that the bank settlements were never intended to make restitution to consumers and tenants.
59. The California Attorney General was allocated $410 million under the bank settlement agreements, none of which is set aside for restitution to consumer and tenants.
60. The Statement of Use begins: “The payment to the California Attorney General’s Office shall be used as follows: Ten percent of the payment shall be paid as a civil penalty and deposited in the Unfair Competition Law Fund.” This point is not for the benefit of consumers; rather provides funds for the discretionary use of the CA-AG.
61. The Statement of Use continues: “The remainder shall be paid and deposited into a Special Deposit Fund created for the following purposes:
a. administration of the terms of this Consent Judgment;
b. monitoring compliance with the terms of this Consent Judgment;
c. enforcing the terms of this Consent Judgment;
d. assisting in the implementation of the relief programs and servicing standards as described in this Consent Judgment; and
e. supporting the Attorney General’s continuing investigation into misconduct in the origination, servicing, and securitization of residential mortgage loans.
62. The above five uses (“a-e”), are not for the benefit of consumers; rather provides funds for the discretionary use of the CA-AG.
63. The Statement of Use continues:
f. funding consumer fraud education, investigation, enforcement operations, litigation, public protection and/or local consumer aid;
g. providing borrower relief;
h. funding grant programs to assist housing counselors or other legal aid agencies that represent homeowners, former homeowners, or renters in housing-related matters;
i. funding other matters, including grant programs, for the benefit of California homeowners affected by the mortgage/foreclosure crisis; or to engage and pay for third parties to develop or administer any of the programs or efforts described above.
64. The above four (and final) uses (“f-i”), are also not for the benefit of consumers; rather simulate same by giving an “either or” scenario including an option providing for the discretionary use of the CA-AG or friends of the CA-AG.
65. For example, in “i,” one of the options is “for the benefit of California homeowners,” while the other option is for the benefit of CA-AG friends: “to engage and pay for third parties to develop programs.”
66. And finally, the use in “g,” is deceiving because the CA-AG fails to state that borrowers will not receive relief directly; rather, the borrower’s bank will receive relief.
67. The bank settlement agreements fail to make restitution to California consumers and tenants.
68. The bank settlement agreements violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of California citizens to access and petition the courts for redress of grievances.
69. California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris knowingly negotiated a deal that could only benefit herself and other California officials. Her knowledge of same is evidenced by the fact she did not personally sign the agreements like the other state attorney generals.
G. Plaintiff’s Unified Petitions for Redress
70. In comparison, Plaintiff’s unified petitions for redress advocated immediate payment to consumers and tenants through existing channels established by state law for this specific purpose.
71. Plaintiff’s petitions sought to hold accountable the State Bar and DRE, prominent RICO enterprise members as far back as January 2009.
72. First, Plaintiff championed a Petition for Writ of Mandate to the California Supreme Court for an order mandating the State Bar and DRE make restitution to consumers harmed by their members.
73. The State Bar’s “Client Security Fund” and DRE’s “Customer Recovery Account,” were specifically set up for this purpose.
74. The vast majority of consumer harm was caused by attorney members of the State Bar colluding with mortgage and real estate members of the DRE.
75. This collusion occurred when attorneys lent their law license to DRE members to help them circumvent the law prohibiting the collection of advanced fees by non-attorneys.
76. The result was hundreds of “law firms” offering loan modification services but few if any actually employed lawyers.
77. Consumers were defrauded by inducement; i.e., by the law firm name and legal retainer agreements. The State Bar did nothing to protect consumers.
78. The DRE advanced the fraud by publishing its “No Objection Letter” list that it claimed contained members “screened” and approved to accept fees in advance.
79. The only screening criteria was the ability to pay to be on the list.
80. The State Bar and DRE must be held accountable for California consumer harm; particularly now that the bank settlement agreements failed.
81. Second, Plaintiff championed a class action lawsuit against UDR on behalf of its California tenants. As foreclosures increased so did the rental market and landlord fraud.
82. UDR’s Residential Lease Agreement (“RLA”) was void, as a matter of law, as it failed to comply with California landlord-tenant law.
83. The preliminary causes of action included:
a. UDR charges “early lease termination liquidated damages” penalties in violation of California Civil Code §1671.
b. UDR charges late fees that are overstated, contrary to recent California case law and rulings, and are unlawful liquidated damages.
c. UDR intentionally contracts with tenants using false names to obtain and sustain a legal advantage over its tenants resulting in diminished tenant-based litigation.
d. UDR fails to state the name, address and telephone number of its the agent for service of process on its as required by California Civil Code section 1962.
e. UDR illegally profits from its Ratio Utility Billing System (RUBS) in violation of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) regulation prohibiting a non-utility from “selling” energy or water.
f. UDR’s RUBS formula is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible and as such, violates public policy. In order for a tenant to calculate its fair share of utilities including common area usage, it must decipher the following formula:
Total monthly utility cost for the community (minus an allowance for common area use if applicable [which is not applicable in the present case]) divided by the number of persons residing at the community times the number of persons residing in the Premises using the applicable ratio multiplier [1 person = 1; 2 persons = 1.6; 3 persons = 2.2; 4 persons = 2.6; 5 persons = 3; each additional person, add..4 to the multiplier.
g. UDR maintains a double revenue stream charging tenants under its RUBS to source the energy and water being supplied to the onsite public laundry rooms and charges them to use the coin-operated machines.
h. UDR illegally defers injury liability via its “hold harmless” clauses in violation of California Civil Code §1668 to prevent liability for its negligent maintenance of habitable premises.
i. UDR withholds security deposits in violation of California Civil Code §1950.5.by charging sums that are landlord’s operating costs and responsibility.
j. UDR illegally evicts its tenants by enforcing illegal leases in collusion with the Orange County Superior Court judicial system.
84. The reason why California is always the largest profit center for UDR is because it unlawfully profits from violation of state law.
85. UDR uses the ill-gotten gains from California to support the growth of its portfolio in other parts of the United States.
86. As she did with the State Bar and DRE, Plaintiff championed restitution from the source of the fraud, UDR.
G. Motion for Federal Injunction Against State Court Prosecutions
87. UDR’s violations of state and federal civil and criminal law unmistakenly constitutes a sufficient cause to issue a federal injunction against UDR’s pending state court prosecutions.
88. UDR’s pending state court prosecutions are two criminal contempt cases brought against Plaintiff for allegedly violating its December 11, 2009 permanent injunction in a civil defamation case UDR did not have standing to file on June 29, 2009.
89. However, UDR’s attorneys filed the contempt case a year post-judgment as civil contempt on Family Law Judicial Council forms pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §1209, et seq.
90. On February 1, 2011, Judge Miller appointed the Orange County Public Defender to “represent Plaintiff’s legal interests due to the possibility of incarceration,” (for a definite term, not coercive confinement) but the public defender acted to protect Judge Miller.
91. Judge Miller also allowed UDR’s attorneys to pose as district attorneys; denied Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment rights as a criminal defendant; sat to adjudicate his own contempt order; and issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest on the same day he was served with Plaintiff’s §1983 Complaint.
92. Judge Miller’s attorney filed Motions to Dismiss but on both occasions failed to include a Declaration or any other form of competent evidence.
93. Plaintiff’s petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was grounded on Judge Miller’s unconstitutional permanent injunctions.
94. While Plaintiff’s petition was pending, Judge Gee dismissed Judge Miller from her §1983 Complaint in his official capacity.
95. Her order justified Judge Miller taking a bribe claiming even that did not preclude him from asserting absolute judicial immunity.
96. The fact of Judge Miller’s acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction were not even considered.
97. In Ex parte Young, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal courts would be justified in exercising their power to enjoin state proceedings where state officials “threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act.”
98. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,  the U.S. Supreme Court contemplated when federal courts must intervene in state court actions for “failure on the part of the state courts to follow the Constitution.”
99. The Supreme Court decided it is incumbent on the federal courts to intervene “in the interest of making certain that clear constitutional principles relating to fundamental personal rights are applied at the outset of state action rather than years later.”
100. Further, the Supreme Court considered when federals court are justified in conducting “a federal trial on the merits of a Civil Rights Act conspiracy claim and a temporary injunction to preserve federal jurisdiction of the matter.”
101. It concluded that the following circumstances warrant said trial and injunction, all of which apply to Plaintiff’s case:
a. “Prosecution (or other injurious action) is strongly threatened against the plaintiffs, the reasonably likely effect of which was to discourage others from associating with plaintiffs and from joining in their cause.”
b. “The seizure of records, the absence of which imposed a serious hardship upon the individual plaintiffs and threatened to put an end to the plaintiff association activities in the area of speech and association on behalf of certain beliefs and programs.”
c. “A charge that the prosecutions threatened and commenced were utterly groundless and commenced solely for the purpose of harassing plaintiffs, punishing them for engaging in constitutionally protected activities, and putting an end to their advocacy of locally unpopular views.”
d. “Federal action commenced after state prosecution was publicly threatened but before prosecutions were actually commenced by indictment.”
e. “Irreparable injury was found to exist in the circumstances; and as such, justification for an injunction against the state proceedings and that this finding was based upon a claim of substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression was being imposed upon the plaintiffs.”
102. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Dombrowski chose to base its decision regarding an injunction on “the protection of those fundamental freedoms which it has repeatedly characterized as essential to the maintenance of individual integrity and the free flow of ideas in a democratic society.”
103. This Motion is based on the Motion, supra, supported by the herein Memorandum of Points & Authorities, Declaration of Erin K. Baldwin, and [Proposed] Order. Dated: October 31, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
Erin K. Baldwin
Plaintiff, Pro Se
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. Plaintiff’s §1983 case originated in state court where parties brought and maintained cases without standing, the courts failed to establish jurisdiction, judgments were entered without due process of law, and Plaintiff was prosecuted for exercising her protected First Amendment rights.
2. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,  The U.S. Supreme Court held:
“The state judicial systems are entitled to operate free from federal interference only so long as they provide adequate protection to constitutional rights in the cases which come before them.
“If they neglect such rights … the Federal Constitution requires that state court independence be limited … because the policies of the Constitution must always prevail over any presumed state prerogative if the basic framework of our constitutional government is to remain intact.
“State courts do not have an absolute right, in the name of state court independence, to ignore the Constitution or to be less than zealous in enforcing it. And it is unquestionably the proper function of the Supreme Court to define what constitutes appropriately zealous enforcement.”
3. Indeed, one of the primary arguments for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was “that the federal government was unworthy of existence if it could not protect its citizens’ fundamental rights.”
4. On August 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed her Section 1983, Civil Rights Act of 1871, Complaint to protect her fundamental rights.
5. Since that date, she has been terrorized by the federal court system with which she relied to provide a remedy for violations to her constitutional rights.
6. What is Plaintiff to do if the Chief Judges of the federals courts she is mandated to appear before lie, cheat and deny her inalienable rights?
7. With great hope and expectation, Plaintiff prays for relief based on the Motion, supra, and supporting law, infra.
8. There are many issues of law at play in this Motion, some that for clarity purposes were argued, supra. The remaining issues fall into two distinct categories:
a. Arguments in support of Plaintiff’s continuing objective of redressing violations of her constitutional rights (“Section I: Moving Forward”); and
b. Arguments in support of removing obstacles hindering Plaintiff’s ability to redress violations of her constitutional rights (“Section II: Moving Past”).
/ / /
SECTION I: MOVING FORWARD
A. Leave to Amend
9. Plaintiff’s requests leave to amend her §1983 Complaint for the reasons stated in the motion, supra, and here.
10. Plaintiff has been waiting nearly a year to amend and there appears no legitimate reason to deny and a plethora of reasons to grant.
11. The Ninth Circuit maintains a liberal approach to requests for leave to amend to such an extent that a denial of same is considered a final and appealable order (see, Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, supra).
12. This is particularly true as to Section 1983 pro se litigants. “We liberally construe a plaintiff’s pro se section 1983 pleadings.” 
13. “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.” 
14. “Before dismissing a complaint, the district court should give a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless it is absolutely clear the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.” 
B. The RICO Enterprise: First Tier
15. The RICO Enterprise began with five major banks  seeking to settle consumer claims for pennies on the dollar in exchange for a moratorium on consumer litigation. This group relied on California state officials and UDR, Inc. to clear the path to settlement.
16. The California state officials included the California Attorney General’s Office; State Bar of California; California Department of Real Estate; and UDR, Inc. together with its operating partnership, United Dominion Realty, L.P. that was directly benefiting by way of collective retaliation and the direct correlation between the rise in foreclosures and the rise in rental income accompanied by the decrease in vacancy rates.
17. However, none of these state agencies (or UDR, although it tried) had standing to sue Plaintiff as she was neither an attorney, real estate professional, or criminal. Therefore, these state agencies fabricated cases against Plaintiff, none of which had standing or established jurisdiction. The first six are outlined below:
C. An Invalid Entity Sues An Unknown Business Entity
18. This first case filed was Parsa Law Group, APC v. Bad Biz Finder, an unknown business entity. Parsa Law Group was not: (a) a valid professional law corporation (APC), (b) the real party in interest; or (c) eligible to offer legal services to the public due to James Parsa’s 2001 multiple convictions of statutory rape.
19. But the real parties in interest / proper plaintiffs, InKor Holdings and non-attorney Arash “Alex” Dastmalchi were in hiding and did not want to be named because they were breaking the law. Plaintiff described the salient collusory relationship, supra.
20. A State Bar member attorney, Parsa, lent his law license to a non-attorney member of the DRE, Dastmalchi, to help Dastmalchi get around the law prohibiting everyone but attorneys from taking advance fees for loan modification services.
21. However, the sub rosa parties in interest were the aforementioned state agencies, aka top tier enterprise members.
22. The defendant, Bad Biz Finder, was named as “an unknown business entity,” (an unlawful twist on “a business entity of unknown form”). In fact, Bad Biz Finder was only a DOE Defendant that could not, on its own, sustain the Complaint.
23. As such, the Complaint was filed without a valid plaintiff or valid defendant and as such, subject matter jurisdiction was never established.
D. Parsa Law Group Attorney Violate Federal Law to Identify Blog Owner
24. However, Parsa’s attorneys, Burkhalter, Kessler, Goodman & George (“BKGG”) were working fast to remedy this fatal defect and in the process violated federal law many times.
25. Beginning just one day after filing the complaint (and before serving it on a defendant as required by discovery rules) BKGG began issuing a series of subpoenas under the authority 18 U.S.C. §2703(c)(2), the United States Code section reserved exclusively for government subpoenas and without a notice requirement to the defendant.
26. These subpoenas were issued to four companies: Road Runner Holdco, LLC; Road Runner High Speed Data; American Online, Inc.; and Time Warner, Inc.
27. In addition to numerous violations of 18 U.S.C. §2703(c)(2), BKGG also violated 47 U.S.C. §551(c), the “Federal Cable Privacy Act,” that prohibits a cable operator from disclosing “personally identifying information concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned,” or a court order.
28. For these specific reasons, the California Constitution has made a right to privacy akin to all other inalienable rights such as freedom of speech, etc. Therefore, BKGG also violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the California Constitution and her due process rights under the U.S. Constitution.
29. On March 6, 2009, BKGG filed a fraudulent First Amended Complaint in which it stated, “As the result of a costly and thorough investigation, Erin Baldwin has been identified as the owners of Bad Biz Finder.” However, no competent evidence was provided.
30. On March 18, 2009, BKGG provided documents to the court it claimed supported adding Plaintiff as a defendant.
31. First, a letter naming Beverly Sullivan (not Plaintiff) as the sole subscriber of firstname.lastname@example.org; and second, an unmarked document that allegedly identified the I.P. address used to set up the blog, Bad Biz Finder.
32. Neither document supported adding Plaintiff as a defendant. Nonetheless, on March 19, 2009, BKGG filed a Second Amended Complaint adding Plaintiff and Beverly Sullivan as individuals into the caption as defendants.
33. The statement in the body was revised: “As the result of a costly and thorough investigation, Erin Baldwin and Beverly Sullivan have been identified as the owners of Bad Biz Finder.”
34. No further amended complaints were filed presenting additional supporting evidence. As such, at no time did the Court have jurisdiction over this case, or over Plaintiff.
35. However, these fatal flaws disappeared on or about May 29, 2009 when the State Bar arranged a bribe to Judge Miller which he accepted in exchange for entering a permanent injunction and $604,515.66 default judgment against Plaintiff.
36. On May 27, 2009, BKGG dismissed Beverly Sullivan from the case as an individual. However, on the June 2, 2009 final judgment , she was resurrected as an alias of Plaintiff.
37. Although no evidence was ever produced to support naming Plaintiff as a defendant, the caption on the final judgment was revised to read:
Bad Biz Finder, an unknown business entity; Erin K. Baldwin, an individual, aka Beverly Sullivan [written in and initialed].
38. However, in the text of the order, the defendant definition was changed to:
Bad Biz Finder, an unknown business entity; Erin K. Baldwin, an individual and doing business as Bad Biz Finder.
E. Four More Cases in Three Weeks
39. The Parsa Law Group Judgment became the boilerplate for 3 additional defamation cases and 1 contempt case brought separately against Plaintiff in a three week period.
40. Three of the four were brought by BKGG, all absorbed (without independent inquiry) the fraudulent naming of Plaintiff as a defendant. Therefore, just like the Parsa Law Group case, all of these cases failed for lack of jurisdiction from the beginning. They are:
a. On June 29, 2009, BKGG filed another defamation case: UDR, Inc. v. Erin K. Baldwin, an individual, also known as Bad Biz Finder and Beverly Sullivan. The result was identical to the Parsa case: Default Judgement with Permanent Injunction.
b. On July 13, 2009, BKGG filed another defamation case: Solutions Law Group, LLC; Solutions Processing, LLC; Jeffrey A. Cancilla; and Craig M. Laverty v. Erin K. Baldwin, an individual, also known as Bad Biz Finder and Beverly Sullivan. This case was dismissed in favor of Plaintiff. Both Jeffrey Cancilla and Craig Laverty were suspended from the practice of law.
c. On July 20, 2009, BKGG inspired: Traut Law Group v. Bad Biz Finder, an unknown business entity, Erin Baldwin, and Does 1-10, inclusive. This case was dismissed in favor of Plaintiff. Both Eric Traut and James Traut were prosecuted by loan modification fraud by the Colorado Attorney General’s Office.
d. And in between the defamation cases, on July 14, 2009, BKGG filed a contempt case in the Parsa Law Group alleging violations of the injunction. On September 13, 2010, the case was dismissed in favor of Plaintiff, after she spent 35 days in jail on a bogus bench warrant issued by Judge Miller on August 31, 2009.
41. BKGG never filed Writs of Execution in connection with the monetary judgments in the Parsa Law Group and UDR cases.
D. UDR Failed to Establish Jurisdiction in Retaliatory Eviction Cases
42. The next two cases were retaliatory eviction cases filed by UDR Villa Venetia Apartments, L.P., a wholly owned subsidiary of UDR, Inc.
43. The cases were assigned to Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco who was required but failed to “obtain a stipulation to hear an unlawful detainer matter,” required under the California Constitution, California Rules of Court, and California Appellate case law to establish jurisdiction. 
44. A proper unlawful detainer action must establish “a landlord/tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.”  Said relationship never existed between Plaintiff and UDR because Plaintiff never executed a contract with UDR Villa Venetia Apartments, L.P. ; she had a contract with an entity described as, “Villa Venetia.”
45. On page one of the complaint, UDR falsely claimed it “had complied with the fictitious business name laws, and was doing business under the name of Villa Venetia.”
46. As corroborated by Orange County Assessor records, the entity name “Villa Venetia” was and is an expired fictitious business name of the former owner of the property, Essex Property Management (“Essex”).
47. After Essex sold the property to Defendant UDR in 2004, the name “Villa Venetia” expired without UDR taking steps to incorporate it into its operations.
48. Nonetheless, UDR fraudulently used the name to contract with tenants for the purpose of maintaining a legal advantage over tenant-based litigation. To this end, UDR also failed to state the name and address of its agent for service of process in violation of California Civil Code §1962.
49. This case was brought and maintained against Plaintiff without first establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 
50. The “lack of jurisdiction is so fundamental a defect that the rule permits a judge to recognize it sua sponte at any time. Among the reasons for this sound rule is that judicial resources are precious, particularly in view of the courts’ steadily burgeoning caseload, and they should not be dissipated in futile proceedings.” 
51. Three days after UDR dismissed the first case in Plaintiff’s favor it filed a second and identical complaint with the same claims, notices and circumstances.
52. UDR knew it was required to set aside the first complaint as to “the entire complaint and all claims,” to begin the eviction process again, and wait for new notices to expire prior to filing a second complaint.
53. However, UDR filed it anyway, the case was assigned to Comm. Pacheco who once again failed to give notice to Plaintiff that she had a right to withhold consent to his hearing the case. Just like the first case, jurisdiction was never established.
54. Therefore, no legitimate legal controversy ever existed, the case was sham litigation, ab initio, because the complaint “was not made out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as part of a pattern or practice of successive filings undertaken essentially for purposes of harassment.” 
55. Because one of UDR’s jobs in the RICO Enterprise was to seize plaintiff’s property and business interests it had to quickly separate Plaintiff from her home without notice so it could then go in and take her property. And that is what it did. (See Decl., infra.)
E. Plaintiff is Entitled to Treble Damages in RICO Claims
56. The genesis of Plaintiff’s RICO causes of action occurred on or about May 29, 2009 when Defendants offered Judge Miller a financial bribe in exchange for a favorable ruling. Since then, mail and wire fraud has been an ongoing method of keeping Plaintiff “in the dark,” terrorizing her with threats of violence, and isolating her from friends and family to prevent her from obtaining support sufficient to raise a defense. They comprise a pattern of racketeering activity namely, numerous predicate acts based on mail fraud, wire fraud, bribery, extortion, and embezzlement. 
57. Defendants are civilly liable to Plaintiff for treble damages in connection with its pattern of racketeering activity that resulted in the physical taking of Plaintiff’s personal property on three separate occasions, i.e., June 19, 2009, on or about August 31, 2009, and on or about February 25, 2010 by multiple predicate acts of extortion, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, and bribery.
58. Defendants are civilly liable to Plaintiff for treble damages in connection with its pattern of racketeering activity that resulted in the physical taking of Plaintiff’s intellectual property on sixteen (16) occasions over the past three (3) years by multiple predicate acts of extortion, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, and bribery.
59. Defendants are civilly liable to Plaintiff for treble damages in connection with its pattern of racketeering activity that resulted in the physical taking of Plaintiff’s business consulting practice by multiple predicate acts of extortion, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, and bribery.
F. Fraud Upon the Court
60. The two major elements of Plaintiff’s arguments are lack of jurisdiction and fraud upon the court. One cannot occur without the other. They are inextricably linked.
61. Fraud upon the court is fraud intentionally committed by officers of the court including judges, attorneys  and court staff.  The U.S. Supreme Court held: “… fraud upon the court is an affront to the administration of justice, a litigant who has been defrauded need not establish prejudice.; and the Ninth Circuit held, “… the perpetrator of the fraud upon the court should not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after the fact.” 
62. This fraud upon the court resulted two in state court judgments in defamation cases brought to chill the exercise of Plaintiff’s protected speech rights.
63. The U.S. Supreme Court held:
a. “It is beyond question that a federal court may investigate a question as to whether there was fraud in the procurement of a judgment.” 
b. “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering States and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” 
64. The full extent of the fraud upon the Court was not discovered by Plaintiff until November 24, 2011. This is the date she discovered that the state court that issued these judgments did so without first establishing jurisdiction over her.
65. The U.S. Supreme Court held:
a. “No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court or without notice to the party.” 
b. “When a Court rules and has no authority to do so, due process of law is violated, judicial immunity no longer exists, and the judgments are regarded as nullities, they are not voidable, simply void.” 
c. “Courts are constituted by authority … If they act beyond their authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities; they are not voidable, but simply void, and this is even prior to reversal.” 
G. Six Degrees of Separation
66. All parties named herein acted to conceal violations of federal and state law by the California Attorney General’s Office (“Attorney General”), the State Bar of California (“State Bar”), the California Department of Real Estate (“DRE”), and landlord, real estate investment trust, UDR, Inc. (“UDR”). These entities are collectively referred to as “State Agencies and UDR.”
67. State Agencies and UDR intentionally and maliciously acted to defraud California consumers and tenants in connection with known illegal loan modification services and illegal California Residential Lease Agreements (“RLA”).
68. State Agencies and UDR feared Plaintiff’s attempts to aid the same persons they sought to defraud would interfere in said intentional fraud and the State’s plan to settle consumer claims with major banks.
69. Accordingly, State Agencies and UDR acted in concert with federal and state judicial officers, law enforcement, county agencies, and private parties, to silence Plaintiff’s speech.
70. By so doing, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated resulting in intentional interference in Plaintiff’s protected property, liberty, and privacy interests and deprived Plaintiff due process of law.
71. Judges Collins and Gee acted to conceal violations of federal and state law by State Agencies, UDR, and previously-assigned or peripherally-involved District Court Judges (collectively hereinafter referred to as, “District Court Judges,”) in connection with Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Case.
72. These District Court Judges include: Central District Court Judges, David O. Carter and Josephine S. Tucker; Eastern District of Washington Judge Robert Whaley; and Central District Court Magistrate Judge Sheri N. Pym.
73. District Court Judges acted to conceal violations of law by fellow Central District Court Judge Cormac J. Carney in connection with Plaintiff’s May 2011 Removal Cases prior to filing her Section 1983 Complaint.
74. Judge Carney (and later, District Court Judges) acted to conceal violations of law by Orange County Superior Court (“OCSC”) Judge Franz E. Miller (“Judge Miller”) who in exchange for a bribe and in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, issued state court judgments without jurisdiction or due process of law.
75. These judgments were issued on behalf of State Agencies and UDR to restrain Plaintiff’s protected speech about matters of public concern prior to publication, and prevented Plaintiff from warning consumers and tenants about fraud targeting them by State Agencies and UDR.
76. District Court Judges and Judge Carney also acted to conceal violations of law by other state court judges that acted to: (a) support the unconstitutional objectives of the judgments; (b) conceal the fact the judgments were invalid; (c) advance other civil cases and criminal charges against Plaintiff by enforcing judgments they knew were invalid; and (d) interfere in Plaintiff’s protected property, liberty and privacy interests.
77. These other state court judges include, but are not limited, to California Supreme Court Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakueye; Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Carolyn Kuhl; OCSC Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco; OCSC Judges Craig E. Robison; Derek G. Johnson; Kim Dunning; and Karen L. Robinson; San Bernardino Superior Court Judges Michael E. Dest; Kyle S. Brodie; Steven Malone; John Martin; Donna Garza-Gunnell; Thomas Garza; and Gilbert Ochoa. (Collectively hereinafter referred to as, “State Court Judges.”)
78. Judge Collins, Judge Gee and District Court Judges acted to directly prejudice Plaintiff’s appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”). As such, Plaintiff directs the herein Motion to Chief Judge Alex Kozinski (“Judge Kozinski”) for an order reinstating Plaintiff’s appeals, to wit:
a. But for Judge Collins’ violation of federal law, Judge Gee would not have been assigned to Plaintiff’s Case.
b. But for Judge Gee’s violation of federal law, orders deeming Plaintiff’s appeals frivolous and in bad faith would not have been made.
c. But for orders prejudicing Plaintiff’s appeals, these appeals would not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in opposition to established Ninth Circuit Appellate Jurisdiction.
79. Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Kozinksi and Circuit Judges Mary S. Schroeder; Edward Leavy; Richard Clifton; S. Wallace Tashima; and Marsha S. Berzon (collectively hereinafter “Circuit Judges”) acted to conceal violations of state and federal law by State Agencies, UDR, Judges Collins and Gee and District Court Judges.
80. Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Kozinski and Circuit Judges acted to prejudice Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
81. On September 24, 2012, Plaintiff’s petition was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court Justices in a formal conference.
82. On September 28, 2012, the Central District announced Judge Collins was vacating her position as Chief Judge two years early and without an explanation.
83. On October 1, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition without an opinion.
84. Plaintiff asserts the Central District maintains a practice and procedure through its “194” Case Status to deliberately deprive pro se civil rights plaintiffs the right to withhold consent to a Magistrate Judge through its referral process and General Order 05-07.
85. Plaintiff asserts that, in turn, the Ninth Circuit maintains a practice and procedure that sanctions improper orders made by Magistrate Judges in the clear absence of jurisdiction by denying appeals of orders made by Magistrate Judges in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
86. Consequently, pro se civil rights plaintiffs ar set up to fail in the Ninth Circuit from the filing through the denial of appeal. This is unconscionable and must be reviewed.
SECTION II: MOVING PAST
84. Protecting a friend is a noble act but not under color of federal law, not to the prejudice of a party to an action, not with knowledge of unlawful acts, and certainly not with knowledge that said protection violates another person’s constitutional rights.
85. All parties involved in Plaintiff’s case are human. Plaintiff asserts “to err is human, to forgive is divine,” but limits her forgiveness to acts admitted and reconciled.
86. In a legal setting, reconciliation equals restitution, declaratory judgments, new orders, recanted orders, disciplinary action, and other official acts to right the wrongs done.
87. To this end, Title 28 USC §1343 states:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
88. Beginning on August 16, 2011, when Plaintiff brought her case to court, all she wanted was fundamental fairness, due process and impartiality. The result, to date, has been very disappointing. Plaintiff believes this can be remedied and her case put back on the right track. It is with the hope and expectation that Plaintiff presents this pleading.
Dated: October 31, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
Erin K. Baldwin
Plaintiff, Pro Se
DECLARATION OF ERIN K. BALDWIN
I, ERIN K. BALDWIN, DECLARE:
1. I bring this Motion in good faith to resolve outstanding matters in my Section 1983 case in order to achieve my original and only objective, to remedy intentional violations of my constitutional rights manifested in interference in my protected property, liberty, and privacy interests.
2. I bring this Motion to contain unlawful activity in my case beginning on August 16, 2011 through and including the present and ongoing.
3. I bring the issues contained in this Motion to the attention of Chief Judge George H. King (“Judge King”) of the Central District Court of California (“Central District”) with hope and expectation that he will acknowledge same and provide a solution for the future.
4. I hereby declare that the facts set forth herein about my case in the Central District are true and correct in my current federal controversy.
5. I also declare upon information and belief that these facts are true and correct for many others similarly situated as pro se litigants appearing before the Central District.
6. I bring the issues contained in this Motion to the attention of Chief Judge Alex Kozinksi (“Judge Kozinski”) of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) with hope and expectation that he will acknowledge same and provide a solution for the future.
7. I hereby declare that the facts set forth herein about my appeals and petitions to the Ninth Circuit are true and correct in my current federal controversy.
8. I also declare upon information and belief that these facts are true and correct for many others similarly situated as pro se litigants appealing to the Ninth Circuit.
9. I bring the issues contained in this Motion to the attention of United States Attorney André Birotte, Jr. of the United States Attorney General’s Office for the Central District Court of California with hope and expectation that he will offer a meaningful response to my request for commencement of a federal grand jury investigation.
10. I hereby declare that the facts set forth herein about crimes committed against me are true and correct in my current federal controversy.
11. I also declare upon information and belief that these crimes are true and correct for many others similarly situated as litigants in the Central District.
12. I am not selfish and self-serving in my quest for justice and urge the courts to consider the big picture in orders made in response to this motion.
13. My protected property interests have been severely and intentionally interfered with in order to prevent me from publicizing and advancing my unified petitions for redress and to conceal widespread culpability.
14. On February 21, 2009, UDR seized my car from the apartment parking claiming it was void a tenant identification sticker. It was sold shortly thereafter.
15. On June 15, 2009, Orange County Superior Court Administrator Kelli Beltran sent me an email confirming our appointment for June 23, 2009 and a stay on the UDR eviction until then.
16. On June 16, 2009 Orange County Sheriff Deputy forcibly removed me from my apartment despite the stay.
17. On June 19, 2009, UDR seized the entire contents of my apartment without cause or due process of law claiming I had abandoned it. In California landlord-tenant law one does not abandon property, one can only abandon an apartment.
18. Shortly thereafter, UDR’s attorney tried to extort $2,200.00 from me to recover property they unlawfully seized.
19. On September 13, 2010, UDR’s attorneys confirmed that UDR sold my property to James Parsa to use as evidence against me and that they knew where my property was located. However, my public defender refused to serve a subpoena for the return of my property.
20. On August 31, 2009, Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco granted possession of my property in storage to Robert J. Abernethy (former Public Storage Board Member and current President of Standard American Corporation) with knowledge I had not been served with a complaint or other court processes and without notice of the hearings or opportunity to be heard to protect my property interests.
21. Robert J. Abernethy is an associate of UDR, Inc. and after his request for default had been rejected four times by the clerk, UDR circumvented the system and set up a hearing before Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco who granted him possession.
22. On or about February 25, 2010, all my personal property was once again seized without due process of law after I was falsely arrested and imprisoned for 35 days.
23. I was told by the San Bernardino District Attorney that I could contact the Captain Greg Garland of the Big Bear Sheriff substation after my release and did so on many occasions, all of which were ignored.
24. I have attempted many times to recover my property and no one will help me including my own public defenders from San Bernardino and Orange Counties.
25. My protected liberty interests have been severely and intentionally interfered with in order to prevent me from publicizing and advancing my unified petition for redress and to conceal widespread culpability.
26. On October 8, 2009 I was unlawfully seized without a warrant from 613 Big Bear Boulevard, Big Bear City, California for being a suspect in making an annoying telephone call. I was falsely arrested, imprisoned, and beaten in custody by five male Big Bear Sheriffs while Tom Layton, State Bar Investigator (and ex-Los Angeles Sheriff) was present.
28. On October 9, 2009, I was transported to West Valley Detention Center where the nurse ordered my immediate release for emergency medical treatment.
29. On October 10, 2009, I was treated in the Bear Valley Emergency Room and later obtained a copy of my medical report that states three times that the attending physician deemed my injuries the result of an assault.
29. On October 14, 2009 I requested a civil rights attorney from the ACLU-Southern California.
30. On October 28, 2009, in connection with my October 8-9, 2009 beating in custody, the San Bernardino District Attorney charged me with two counts of assault on a peace officer, resisting arrest, giving false information to a pace officer, and violating a court order.
30. On February 25, 2010 I was unlawfully seized from 1017 Mountainview, Big Bear City, California and falsely arrested and imprisoned without a warrant for 35 days during which time I never received a preliminary nor was I charged with a crime.
31. On August 31, 2009, I was subjected to a civil bench warrant without probable cause and based on a case where the plaintiff had no standing to sue and the court never established jurisdiction.
32. On August 16, 2011, I was subjected to a civil bench warrant for arrest without probable cause and based on a case where the plaintiff had no standing to sue and the court never established jurisdiction.
33. On September 23, 2009, I was subjected to a written and executed “Private Party Arrest Warrant,” that has no legal force or effect during which time my property was searched without a legitimate warrant and computer serial numbers were documented.
33. On October 17, 2009, I was subject to another written and executed “Private Party Arrest Warrant,” that has no legal force or effect signed by former housemate Keith White.
34. I declare that the officials acting under color state law knew that I, my house and property was protected from unlawful search and seizure but violated it anyway.
35. I declare the officials acting under color state law to process the Private Party Arrest Warrant knew it had not legal force or affect but used it anyway.
36. I declare the officials acting under color state law that caused my arrests and incarceration knew there was no probable cause but arrested and incarcerated me anyway.
I swear under penalty of perjury and under the laws of the state of California that the facts contained herein and true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Dated: October 31, 2012
Erin K. Baldwin, Declarant
|Erin K. BaldwinPost Office Box 3141Beaumont, California 92223(678) email@example.comPlaintiff, Pro Se|
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION
|ERIN K. BALDWIN, an Individual,Plaintiff,v.STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.and Does 1-10, Inclusive,Defendants.||CASE NO. 5:11-cv-01300Unassigned Pursuant to28 U.S.C. §137[PROPOSED] ORDERAS TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FORDECISIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY; FEDERAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION;FEDERAL INJUNCTION OVER STATE COURT PROSECUTIONS; ETC.|
HAVING REVIEWED THE CASE AND PLEADINGS BEFORE THE COURT AND FINDING GOOD CAUSE, THE COURT ORDERS:
1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file a Third Amended Complaint on or before January 1, 2013.
2. Plaintiff’s request for equal privileges to electronic filing of all documents is GRANTED. This order shall take effect immediately.
3. Plaintiff’s request to serve her Third Amended Complaint and Summons to all parties via email is GRANTED. If a defendant uses a corporate agent for service of process where an email address is not readily available, said defendant shall, upon Plaintiff’s request, provide an alternate email for service of process. Service shall be deemed served upon receipt of electronic transmission.
4. Plaintiff shall file a separate Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint for each defendant and shall include as an attachment to same a receipt of electronic transmission.
5. Responsive pleadings shall be due thirty (30) days from the date Plaintiff files a Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint as described, supra.
6. Plaintiff’s request for a generic retaliation cease and desist order directed to all named defendants to be served with the Third Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall prepare said order for the Court’s review. Upon execution, the order shall take effect but Plaintiff shall serve each defendant a copy of same with the Third Amended Complaint.
7. Plaintiff shall communicate with the court via Proposed Order any further acts of retaliation by defendants named in her case. The court shall evaluate any acts of retaliation and shall address by order on a case-by-case basis appropriate sanctions.
8. Plaintiff’s request for an order voiding the judicial assignment of District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee (“Judge Gee”) is GRANTED. Until further notice, Chief Judge George King shall preside over Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Case.
9. Plaintiff’s request for an order voiding all orders of Judge Gee is GRANTED. They shall have no legal force effective immediately. This applies to the reinstatement of Judge Miller in his official capacity dismissed by order of Judge Gee.
10. Plaintiff’s request for an order voiding the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Dismissal Orders in Case Nos. 11-57210; 12-55081; 12-55087; 12-70296; 12-56241; and 12-56572 is GRANTED.
11. Plaintiff’s request for an order reinstating the appeals, setting briefing and oral argument before a Merits Panel in Ninth Circuit Case Nos. 11-57210; 12-55081; 12-55087; 12-70296; 12-56241; and 12-56572 is GRANTED.
12. Plaintiff’s request for a decision on pending Petitions for Rehearing in Ninth Circuit Case Nos. 11-57210; 12-55081; 12-55087; 12-70296 is GRANTED.
13. Plaintiff’s request for assignment of a Magistrate Judge for Discovery Purposes is GRANTED. A Magistrate Judge for Discovery Purposes shall be assigned no later than November 15, 2012.
14. Plaintiff’s request for an order commencing discovery is GRANTED. On or before November 15, 2012, the assigned Magistrate Judge shall issue same.
15. Plaintiff’s request for a jury trial is GRANTED. A jury trial date will be set in coordination with the Magistrate Judge and upon filing and service of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint on or before January 1, 2013.
16. Plaintiff’s request for a Grand Jury Investigation is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall coordinate these activities directly with the U.S. Attorney General’s Office to commence said investigation no later than November 15, 2012.
17. The assigned U.S. Attorney shall include Plaintiff in all related interviews, teleconferences and internal meetings, and shall include Plaintiff in the distribution list of all related emails, correspondence and faxes.
18. Plaintiff’s request for a federal injunction over state court prosecutions is GRANTED as to UDR, Inc. v. Erin K. Baldwin, Orange County Superior Court (“OCSC”) Case No. 30-2009-00125305. No further proceedings in OCSC Case No. 30-2009-00125305 shall occur until further notice.
19. Plaintiff’s request to recall the bench warrant ordered by Judge Miller on August 16, 2011 and issued on August 18, 2011 in connection with the first UDR, Inc. contempt case is GRANTED. This Order shall be served on Judge Miller for processing.
20. Plaintiff’s request for an order to proceed in forma pauperis in the Central District Court of California Case No. 5:11-cv-01300 is GRANTED.
21. Plaintiff’s request for an order to proceed in forma pauperis in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Case Nos. 11-57210; 12-55081; 12-55087; 12-70296; 12-56241; and 12-56572 is GRANTED.
22. Any future related actions in the Central District or Ninth Circuit shall be granted in forma pauperis status upon filing.
23. Plaintiff’s request for an order disqualifying Sarah Overton as counsel of record for Defendant Judge Miller is GRANTED in light of the inclusion of her as a defendant in Plaintiff’s Corrected Second Amended Complaint dated November 14, 2011 and likelihood she will be called as a material witness at trial.
24. Plaintiff’s request for an order disqualifying the Orange County Public Defender (“OCPD”) as counsel of record for Plaintiff in OCSC Case Nos. 30-2009-00117752 and 30-2009-00125305 is GRANTED in light of the inclusion of the OCPD and individual OCPD attorneys to Plaintiff’s November 14, 2011 Corrected Second Amended Complaint and the likelihood of calling same as material witnesses at trial. Said order is effective immediately.
25. Plaintiff’s request for an order mandating release of her client files upon disqualification of the OCPD, in OCSC Case Nos. 30-2009-00117752 and 30-2009-00125305, is GRANTED including notes, memoranda, emails, correspondence, faxes, pleadings, exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, evidence collected and/or demanded, status of subpoena by UDR issued to San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department for any and all records pursuant to Case Nos. MSB906348, MSB905837 and FSB1000789, etc..
26. Plaintiff’s request for a certified copy of all transcripts from cases in which she was the defendant in Orange County Superior Court is GRANTED, including Case Nos. 30-2009-00117752; 30-2009-00125305 (through and including the present October 16, 2012 hearing); 30-2009-00244203; 30-2009-00248999; 30-2009-00126004; 30-2009-00126328; 30-2009-00276399. Transcripts shall be delivered free of charge to Plaintiff no later than November 15, 2012.
27. Plaintiff’s request for a certified copy of all transcripts and pleadings from cases in which she was the defendant in San Bernardino Superior Court is GRANTED. These cases include Criminal Case Nos. MSB906348; MSB905837; FSB1000789; and Civil Case Nos. CIVHS900261; and FAMHS1000015. Transcripts shall be delivered free of charge to Plaintiff no later than November 15, 2012.
28. Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment ruling on whether the underlying Default Judgments with Permanent Injunctions are constitutionally sound is GRANTED. This determination shall be decided no later than November 15, 2012.
IT IS SO ORDERED
 See, Judge Gee Order of January 18, 2012: “On January 17, 2012, this case was administratively reassigned to the present judicial officer.”
 469 F.3d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2006).
 580 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2009).
 Citing Estate of Conners v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993).
 Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975).
 Crimes related to bribery and concealment of the crime of bribery.
 Crimes related to obstruction of justice and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to obstruction of criminal investigations and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to mail fraud and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to wire fraud and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to financial institution fraud and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to obstruction of justice in law enforcement and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to tampering, with a witness, victim, or informant and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to monetary transactions in property and concealment of same.
 Crimes related to interstate transportation of stolen property and concealment of same.
 Living Designs, Inc. v. E. I. Dupont de Numours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir.2005); cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2861 (2006); Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
 Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
 United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1043 (2005).
 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61–65 (1997).
 Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, 79 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir.1996).
 Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447, 450 (9th Cir.1991).
 Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909, 914[102 Cal.Rptr.3d 12]
 Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1343-1344 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 178].
 Ziegler v.Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 548 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 312].
 Powers v. Ashton (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 787 [119 Cal.Rptr. 729].
 Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 691 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 122].
 This list is not exhaustive.
 California Civil Code §§1671 and 3302; Orozco v. Casimiro [(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th Supp. 7].
 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
 Lopez v. Department of Health Serv., 939 F.2d 881, 882-83 (9th Cir.1991).
 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988).
 Id. (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1987)).
 Bank of America; Wells Fargo; CitiGroup; JP Morgan-Chase; and IndyMac.
 Cal Const, Art VI, §22; CRC 2.816; Yetenekian v. Superior Court (1983) 140 CA3d 361, 366.]
 Marvell v Marina Pizzeria (1984) 155 CA3d Supp 1, 5, 7–12, 202 CR 818.
 An intentional violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the California Constitution.
 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1975).
 Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 69269 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) Kaiser at *12 (quoting USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Building & Construction Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994)).
 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § I, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
 Including, but not limited to, private attorneys, public defenders, and district attorneys.
 Including, but not limited to, docket clerks, court reporters, administrators, courtroom clerks, and sheriffs operating at or from the court.
 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
 Dixon v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003).
 Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 90 L.Ed. 1447.
 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878).
 Scott v. McNeil, 154 U.S. 34, 46, 38 S.L. ed. 896,901, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108. Old Wayne Mut.L. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 260 (1907).
 Williamson v. Berry 8 HOW. 945, 540 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850).
 Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. 1 Pet. 328 (1828)